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Abstract:
This article intends to think the concrete reality of the family from the perspective of 
a philosophical anthropology, based on the biblical-Christian hermeneutic model. At the 
same time, starting from this particular anthropology, it suggests a general anthropology 
according to a family matrix. This anthropology is understood as relation of different per-
sons, based on the model of donation. The concrete mode of its accomplishment occurs in 
family relations, like filiation, fraternity, conjugality and parenthood.
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Abstrakt:
Artykuł stawia sobie za zadanie przemyślenie konkretnej rzeczywistości rodziny z  per-
spektywy antropologii filozoficznej, opartej na biblijno-chrześcijańskim modelu herme-
neutyki. Jednocześnie, rozpoczynając od tej szczególnej antropologii, proponuje się antro-
pologię ogólną, zgodną z modelem rodziny. Antropologia ta jest rozumiana jako relacja 
różnych osób, oparta na modelu darowania. Konkretny sposób jej realizacji pojawia się 
w relacjach rodzinnych jak synostwo, braterstwo, partnerstwo i rodzicielstwo.
Słowa kluczowe:
rodzina; antropologia; dar; różnica; relacja.
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I see here anthropology as an interpretation of the human that allows framing 
their practices in an orientation of meaning. Therefore my point of view is not 
limited to the description of various pragmatics, without regarding their suita-
bility to what is considered to be properly human. I place myself insofar at the 
philosophical level of a hermeneutics of meaning, in this case applied to what we 
consider to be humanity.
I also recognize, so that the assumptions of hermeneutics concerned are clear, 
that the proposed anthropology is based on a biblical-Christian interpretation 
of reality, specially of human reality. And the first element of this reading is the 
consideration of the personal human as relationship of differences. Within a ten-
dentiously unifying and standardizing horizon – based on the hermeneutics of 
the undetermined and primordial one – the biblical world contrasts difference 
as the original constituent of creation (cf. Beauchamp 1969). This difference as-
sumes personal characteristics in the constitution of the human, while based 
on the uniqueness and individuality of each human person. At the same time, 
precisely because it is an irreducible difference, it can only be thought of as re-
lational. Thus, each human person is based on the relational constitution of his 
difference, which is precisely the basis of personal identity.
The purpose of this article is to analyse the role of the family in the range of 
relationships that constitute personal identities, as insurmountable differences. 
Therefore it is about examining family relationships as the core of the constitu-
tion of the human, in other words, about the basis of an anthropology. We shall 
leave aside other possible approaches to the roles of the family: both a strictly 
biological perspective and a social or institutional perspective, or regarding the 
classification of the transmission of assets or of other factors, even though all 
these elements can be very important for the basic understanding of this insti-
tution. Accordingly, while it outlines an anthropology of the family, we will finally 
present a general anthropology based on a family relational model.
1. Donation
Before dealing with the concrete anthropology of family relationships, it is 
appropriate to contextualize, from the general and theoretical point of view, the 
phenomenological basis of these relationships. I  believe that this contextual-
ization can be condensed in the exploration of the category of the gift, as a de-
terminant of certain understanding of reality. I do not intend to address here 
the meaning of the strictly phenomenological notion of donation as the basis of 
a kind of fundamental ontology. It is enough to point at some of the major in-
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sights of this phenomenological development to see their importance for what 
we consider an anthropology of relationship. In this field it is particularly im-
portant to distinguish between relationships based on gift, and those based on 
other modalities.
Paul Ricœur, for example, distinguishes the “gift economy” of the pure ap-
plication of the “golden rule” in interpersonal relationships (cf. Ricœur 1996; 
Ricœur 1994, 273–279). This “rule” constitutes the most universal and obvious 
way of ethical reasoning: do what you want to be done to you and do not do what you 
don’t want to be done to you. It is based on reciprocity as a condition, and therefore, 
on some kind of individual interest, so that it may be extended to the formula-
tion: “do, so that it will be done to you” and “do not do, so that it won’t be done to 
you”: Insofar it follows the traditional formula of an all-interested and rentable 
relationship: do ut des. Now the gift economy corresponds to a modality of ac-
tion – and relationship – that overcomes this profitable dynamism and is based 
on a kind of non-justification of the gift: I give for nothing and don’t expect any-
thing in return. Reciprocity, therefore, does not play a role here.
Jacques Derrida, in turn, when speaking of the quality of the gift, counteracts 
precisely economy as a relationship based on reciprocity, i.e., always already de-
termined by interest or by profitability (cf. Derrida 1991). In this radical contrast, 
the gift is defined precisely by its historical impossibility, in such a way that any 
realization – implying a donor, a receiver and something given – would reduce 
the gift to the horizon of economy, insofar to reciprocal and profitable exchange. 
The gift is only possible insofar as it absolutely cannot be given and, accordingly, 
lives of the not-life of its excess, without historical incarnation.
Jean-Luc Marion, in turn, approaches the category of gift also to that impos-
sibility, insofar he thinks it as an excess, either in relation to the self or in refer-
ence to the hermeneutic horizon of its own interpretation. But he thinks the im-
possibility of giving something differently from Derrida. If it is true that he also 
intends to overcome all reduction of the donation to the economic exchange, 
which would make the gift a  not-gift (cf. Marion 1987, 1989, 2003). Insofar he 
approaches Derrida when he argues that the “gift requires some non-appearance 
or non-phenomenality” (Caputo 1999, 66). However, he does not reach this claim 
immediately, right from the start, from a radical deconstruction. His route is the 
one of the phenomenological reduction, which starts with the phenomenal real-
ity of the gift or of the donation, given in every gift, in an exchange process be-
tween a donor and a receiver, by reference to something that is given. From this 
basis, he works his giveness (donneité, Gegebenheit), until he reaches the donation 
itself. Well, it is at the level of this donation reduced to itself that Marion notes 
the donation to be independent of any donor or receiver, even of any objectively 
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given gift. In this sense, the donation, to be such, cannot appear as a phenom-
enon among phenomena, but as a  result of phenomenological reduction that 
understands it from other phenomena.
However, the phenomena leading us more easily to donation as a non-phe-
nomenon are the “saturated phenomena” (cf. Marion 1987, 2001). This phenom-
ena harbour themselves an excess of giving, becoming a hyper-donation or a hy-
per-appearance. Thus, it is not the immediate perception of the impossibility of 
giving, by the dynamics of desire, but rather the perception mediated by the 
phenomenal saturation of given reality that allows us to access – to believe – the 
mystery of donation itself, as primordial mystery of all that is, being beyond be-
ing or without being.
In all these readings we find a common denominator: the excessive size of 
the relationship according to the gift, which breaks the strict dynamism of reci-
procity and of profitability. In all these readings, however, there is a tendency to 
assume such a transcendence of the category of gift, that does not allow its really 
historical experience, within the concrete relations between real human beings 
always already subordinated to the dynamism of economy and therefore, at most 
practitioners of the golden rule.
It is true that the majority of human relationships is marked by this limita-
tion, considering that social harmony is always determined by a commitment to 
the best possible organization, but which always falls short of an ideal gift. “Pol-
itics”, according to Ricœur, would be originated precisely from this process of 
a permanent possible commitment and in better balance of individual interests 
(cf. Ricœur 1986, 403). The dynamism of the gift would always be beyond this real 
possibility. Ricœur – more evidently than Derrida or even than Marion, though 
partly in the sense of both – admits the need for reference to the size of the gift 
as “regulative idea” or eschatological catalyst. Nevertheless the fact is that, for 
concrete historical achievements, the excess of that category never allows real 
full realization.
But even assuming some reason of the reading proposed by the three French 
philosophers, it seems to me that this radical negativity of the gift may be ques-
tioned. I propose to recognize a possibility of incarnation of its excess, without 
losing its excessive nature. It’s what can be said generally about the category of 
love, thought of as mercy or agape. Following the question pertinently posed by 
John Milbank – “can a gift be given?” (Milbank 1995) – I would respond positively, 
although with the reservation that the giving of this gift implies the historical 
eruption of an excessive size in relation to all historical processes and excessive 
in relation also to the subjects of history. But it is actually an eruption given, 
and therefore possible; i.e., its excess cannot be identified with an impossibility – 
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which would always keep it in this impossibility – but with the critical rupture 
with other modalities of relation, produced exclusively by the immanence of hu-
man beings.
For my part, I advance the thesis that the possibility of the historical realiza-
tion of this excess occurs, though not exclusively, especially in family relation-
ships. Incidentally, the similar relationships, outside the strict scope of family, 
are in large part analogue to the family relationships. However, typically fami-
ly relationships – which constitute the human as such, but specifically through 
a relational mode that exceeds him – are not undefined relationships, only de-
termined by the generic category of the gift. Those are typical relations in which 
the dynamism of the free gift is articulated always in a different way. They are 
different relationships and relational differences, that will lead us to a very char-
acteristic general anthropology, as we shall see.
2. Relationships
2.1. Filiation
Michel Henry, in one of his most publicized works (cf. Henry 2003), gives 
a chapter the symptomatic title: “Forgetting the condition of son”. This forget-
ting corresponds to the birth of the “transcendental illusion of the ego, which 
is to be taken as the basis of his being” (Henry 2003, 140). Thus it becomes clear 
what conversely the condition of son would mean. In contrast, the refusal of 
this condition means that the “ego regards as his achievement this being him-
self, this Self, as if the ‘me’ were coming just from himself and would refer just 
to himself” (Henry 2003, 140). Accordingly, filiation implies recognition of the 
otherness of the origin.
This reading of Henry can inspire the reconsideration of that primordial 
human relationship, as a  fundamental constituent of his human identity. It is, 
therefore, the first important datum of anthropology. It is true that Henry refers 
to this condition by a relation to the otherness of Life, which ultimately finds its 
truth in reference to God, considering that this was the position of Christianity. 
In his words “man is only a man insofar as he is a Son, a Son of Life, that is, of 
God” (Henry 2003, 134). I do not discuss here the correctness of this statement, 
all because I assume the Christian basis of my proposal of anthropology. I  just 
don’t agree with the dialectic and radical conclusion that the French phenome-
nologist takes from this fundamental statement, opposing nature and super na-
ture (even if understood phenomenologically). According to him “Christ seems 
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to contrast himself with people understood as natural beings. The natural fili-
ation that is appropriated to them and that situates them in the world’s time, 
according to the order of genealogies ... is abruptly broken off and rejected by 
Christ ...” (Henry 2003, 129).
As it is known, the contrast between nature and super nature – between nat-
ural filiation and Arch-filiation, to take in Henry’s nomenclature – doesn’t need 
to be taken in that way. Furthermore, the very Christian tradition enables the 
interpretation of natural filiation as realization and revelation of the Arch-filia-
tion, which makes it necessary, though not absolute.
Thus, it seems possible to apply the intuition of the phenomenology of Henry 
to that relationship that primarily defines our human condition, regardless of 
the level that one applies to this relationship. To be a son is to recognize not to 
be an absolute principle of himself, but the gift of another. It is certain that this 
recognition is accomplished in numerous ways, as a way of being and a state of 
mind. But it is also true that the filiation held specifically in the family – which 
results from the relation to concrete parents and, for these, to the previous gen-
erations – belongs, even because of its biological roots, to the basic construction 
of identities. In principle, it is in the family where we learn – or not – to be a son 
(a daughter), in every way. There is, therefore, a close relation between the fam-
ily relationship and this original condition of mankind, where conscience and 
experience emerges from this condition, as actually lived.
This concrete relation to parents – and, by extension, to grandparents – is 
always bodily constituted, in reference to those concrete parents and those con-
crete grandparents. Accordingly this is also the place of incorporation of the re-
lation of the human to the body and, in it, to space and time. The spatial condi-
tions – and limits – of human existence are experienced on the limitation of the 
relationship between one’s own body and the body of another; in this case, by 
the limitation of the relation to the parent’s body, to the origin. This restriction 
happens in a family by the relation to the home as the place of other relations. 
The home as a place, in conjunction with other places and because of its status 
of housing real people and with real family relationships, allows the first experi-
ence of the spatiality of the human body (cf. Lacroix 2001).
Similarly, not only for the relation to changes in own body, but specially for the 
relation to body transformation of others – specially grandparents, through aging – 
one develops the experience of time and temporality of the human, also its tran-
sience, on the path of death. The experience of mortal human condition is a fun-
damental experience, which is being increasingly accepted as “normal”. Learning 
space, time and, with it, death – in the old tradition of the ars moriendi – is one of the 
most important functions of the familiar anthropological dynamism.
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2.2. Fraternity
The topic of fraternity has been undoubtedly one of those, which have most 
excited the history of the West culture, just to mention the centrality it occupies 
in the “theory” of the French Revolution. But it is undoubtedly one of the no-
tions, which finds more difficulties in the social realization of any anthropolog-
ical ideal. First of all, the fraternal relationship implies a relationship of equals, 
but is not guided by agreements, regulations or contracts. It is a  relationship 
“naturally” free, i.e., without conditions nor interests. One loves his brother just 
because he is brother.
The gratuity of this relationship between equals – and therefore it is not re-
lation of origin (originating or originated) – has a fundamental condition and an 
inevitable consequence in order to be a  true fraternity relationship. The con-
dition refers to the common origin. Brothers are children of the same parents, 
even if that parenting is metaphorical – children of the same people, of the same 
situation, etc. Thus, the first condition of the fraternity relationship is sharing 
the parental relationship. That is why humans can only be considered brothers 
when they are assumed as children (son and daughter).
The consequence refers to the way that responsibility accompanies fraterni-
ty. This, in fact, implies a different way of liability from the mere responsibility 
for myself (for my own actions, for example). The fraternity always involves 
responsibility for the other, precisely for the brother. An original narrative of 
this relationship is the biblical story of Cain and Abel. And the fundamental 
anthropological question is always “Where is your brother?”, not exactly “What 
did you do?”. The fraternity felt there is when the brother “feels” (more than he 
knows and more than he should) responsible for his brother. This responsibility 
is independent of the responsibility for myself and regardless of all conditions 
or merits. Regardless of my action, I take the “blame” for my brother; regardless 
of his action, I assume his own forgiveness. This profound – and even paradox-
ical – degree of responsibility goes into the replacement, in which I assume the 
place of my brother, to take the consequences of his own action (cf. Levinas 
1974, 179ff).
Well, although the fraternity relationship felt as “natural” – a brother does 
not ask why  – it is certain that it is the most difficult and paradoxical in the 
human existence. So, that “naturalness” does not replace the need for practical 
learning. And it finds its first context precisely in the relationship between blood 
brothers, who share the same family origin. That’s why the fraternal relation-
ship, as family relationship, is anthropologically foundational, as the basis of so-
cial and universal fraternity.
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2.3. Conjugality
Starting from the fraternity relationship that animates all humans, men and 
women, regardless of other determinations of their relational identity, there is 
a way of relationship that, not abandoning the level of fraternity, deepens other 
levels. I  speak about the relationship between man and woman, as realization 
of the respective sexuality. This relationship is in the basis of what we can call 
conjugality and that, somehow, constitutes the origin of family. In fact it is from 
the practical realization of this conjugality that a man and a woman give birth 
to a new family. Within this specific type of relationship, it is necessary to con-
sider, first of all, the much-discussed relation between nature and culture. Even 
though it may be much discussed today, I begin with a basic assumption: cultures 
and individuals cannot dispose and transform arbitrary and subjectively data of 
fundamental understanding of human beings. Only thus one safeguards what 
defines the human, in its basic dignity, not being the product of itself, neither 
as a  subject nor as a  society, but transcendently originated (regardless of the 
interpretation of what this transcendence might mean). Therefore, in respect to 
the most fundamental elements, no subject and no culture can change the basic 
ethical “imperatives”.
This ethical determinant of human “nature” is the most fundamental, and it 
would not be, for example, the rationalist interpretation of the human being, like 
the Stoics understood it, or its sociologist interpretation, as predominantly the 
modern was. Thus, this “natural” determinant implies and challenges the human 
being in its integrity, not putting certain “parts” of himself against other “parts”, 
supposedly destructors or “unnatural”.
Based on this integral notion of human being, as a criterion that is articu-
lated in the definition of his “nature” like a personal being as unique body with 
spiritual dimension – and as unique spirit, with body dimension – we can say 
that a certain sexual anthropology is based on a vision of the human “nature”; 
and we can say that this vision is given to it and not invented or constructed by 
each subject or each culture – even if, in its concrete realization, the history of 
the subject and the brand of culture are central to the construction and the dis-
covery of identity.
This is not, admittedly, a “nature” understood simply biologically. In fact, be-
ing a human person is naturally cultural. But it is also assumed that the biologi-
cal dimension of human “nature” is not a secondary element, simply culturally 
or subjectively manageable. To take the body seriously– even in its dimension 
of “flesh”  – implies taking seriously its biological constitution and the mean-
ing of its contribution to personal identity, to interpersonal relationships and 
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to the resulting cultures. On the other hand, to take the notion of “nature”, in 
this broader sense, implies accepting the human person as a “sacred” being, i.e., 
untouchable in its dignity, not available, neither to others nor to himself, nor to 
the most diverse systems.
Well, relationality, source of society, is the way to realize the fullness of the 
human “nature”, as personal “nature”. And the core of relationality is the differ-
ence. As such, the difference is the fundamental premise, so that anthropology 
can conceive the human person as being essentially relational. Among all the 
possible differences – which are immense – stands out, as basic, the difference 
between man and woman. In this sense, the hermeneutics of the human always 
presupposes concrete humanity as man or as woman. This always means and 
cannot be forgotten that humanity happens as relationship between man and 
woman; this relationship, on one hand, implies the two ways of being-human 
and, on the other, is implied by them. No one is human without being, in absolute 
alternative, as man or as woman, in the relationship involved there – which gives 
the fullness of every human to each way of being, but, at the same time, prevents 
the absolutism of each one of these ways. I.e., no one is absolutely human being 
“just” a man or “just” a woman. Not that each is only a part or half human – how 
certain Platonic conception of love wants, as a result of the division of the human 
into two parts. But because each one is fully – and equally – human, being it in its 
difference and therefore in its relation to another different: man in relation to 
the woman, and woman in relation to man. To ignore this fundamental relation-
ship would be a way of completely perverting the notion of the human person 
and its practical realization. “Even though what counts as male or female is con-
ditioned by the respective culture and society, remains the biological difference 
between man and woman and the division of ‘tasks’ that results; and this differ-
ence points, in turn, to a polarity in the personal dimension ... It is this polarity 
that precedes and underlies all possible variations and brands fundamentally the 
human being” (Splett 1996, 43).
It should be noted that this perspective is far from a defence of a gender-du-
alism. Firstly, because it doesn’t propose any dualism but a relational difference, 
which is radically different. In this sense, I distance myself clearly from the in-
terpretation proposed by Donna Haraway. She accuses this dualism of being the 
source of all conflicts and proposes to overcome them (cf. Haraway 1991). I mean, 
on the contrary, that the relationship between man and woman is not dualistic 
but differential. Thus, it is not a source of conflict but the possibility of being 
human. Secondly, because my perspective does not refer specifically to gender 
difference (male and female) but to sexual difference between man and woman 
as the bodily basis of anthropological relationship.
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From this radical relationality, which presupposes the relation and the differ-
ence in the origin of each concrete person – and of the societies that are organ-
ized as well – we can understand a reading of human existence in terms of what 
we ambiguously call love. If personal identity results from a primordial relation 
to the different, the meaning of this identity cannot be but the gift of oneself to 
the other, as the fullness of inter-human relationship. Love goes on to define the 
core of humanity, so the respective anthropology. And it is love understood in 
its complex multidimensionality. To the universal fraternity, while filiation or 
friendship without borders – even for “enemies”, that is, more different than the 
different, which seem to have nothing in common – joins the relationship that 
values eros or desire, which attracts certain people, specially the specific sexual 
desire that draws man and woman.
However, the desire is not an absolute in itself and therefore remains ambigu-
ous in its orientation. Thus, the criterion of anthropologically correct desire be-
comes another dimension of love, agape, which basically means the ability to give 
the own life for another, to understand the meaning of existence as a free gift of 
life, according to the modality of the gift. Thus, the primary desire of the human 
person must be the “welfare” of the other – so he loves him, wanting him to that 
extent only – and not as a selfish function of the self. Love is thus the correct con-
gregation of friendship with eroticism and the giving of oneself, all in the same 
movement that excludes oppositions between these dimensions. Sexuality finds 
its privileged place there, thus taking its “sacred” and religious dimension – until 
its sacramentality, by the Christian concept of marriage – although remaining 
perfectly human and profane.
2.4. Maternity / Paternity
Even though humans are beings from others (filiation) and beings with others 
(fraternity and conjugality), this still does not complete its way of being. In this 
sense, an anthropology of the origin and an anthropology of the alliance would 
still not be enough; because fertility is also an essential element of the human. For 
some cultures it is even its distinctive dimension. In this sense, being-from-anoth-
er and being-with-others is headed, of course, for the being-for-others. And this 
full size, a sign of human maturity, finds in the pragmatic of the being-so-that-the-
other-can-be its paramount achievement. Thus, fertility, either in direct biological 
effect or in derived senses, is the expression of the human purpose.
Without going into exaggerated details, that could lead us to certain artifi-
ciality, it seems to me obvious that this dimension of human fertility takes on 
motherhood and fatherhood its own achievement. In a very simple and even 
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superficial way, one might consider that motherhood implies a strong continu-
ity between who generates and who is generated. It emphasizes the co-owner-
ship of both and even the similarity, and emphasizes a kind of natural symbi-
otic relation between the given and the received (being). Fatherhood, in turn, 
develops more explicitly the difference between who gives and who receives, 
making the relation of the gift of the other being as an institution of an irre-
ducible difference.
This statement of the difference allows, at the same time, to think wheth-
er motherhood or fatherhood as personal relationships, rather than as strictly 
biological relationships. These, of course, cannot be completely bypassed or ig-
nored. But the way of relationship established by fertility is deeper and is only 
specifically human when it reaches the depth of the free relationship.
It is in this sense that Paul Ricœur talks about fatherhood as naming (cf. 
Ricœur 1969, 458–486; Duque 2004, 222ff), which allows the passage to the 
symbolic dimension of fatherhood, beyond its phantasmal dimension. In fact, 
a certain phantasm of parenthood can lead to the castration of the son, nulli-
fying his freedom, by imposition of authority; another phantasm may lead to 
the same, by exaggerated paternalism or maternalism. Therefore, the phan-
tasms of fatherhood and motherhood, metaphorically condensed in the Oedi-
pus complex, become only compatible with human dignity when they are over-
come in the symbol of both. And this overshoot is caused by the free linguistic 
recognition. So, being a child – and being a parent – is not a pure event of na-
ture. Without ceasing to be, it is always already an event of interpersonal and 
linguistic relationship, which implies the free acceptance of being originated 
and of being the origin.
This kind of relation – as the origin of the different other – can mark several 
areas of human relations. However its original mode takes place in family and is 
also pedagogically in the family that one learns to be mother and father, in order 
to understand the own existence as existence for others to be, in permanent 
fertility of the being.
3. Aperture
A reflection on the human, as being of family relationships, has led us to an 
anthropology of the family. This will allow us, finally, to throw some topics of 
a general (philosophical) anthropology; i.e., the characteristics of the human, as 
developed in family relationships, can be thought of and applied to all the mo-
dalities of relationships, albeit in a derivative or almost metaphorical way, thus 
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contributing to a general anthropology according to a family matrix. In this an-
thropology, family relationships serve therefore as a model, not only theoretical 
but also pragmatic, to any kind of relationship. And it serves also as the model 
of society itself, as a network of personal relations, more or less organized into 
complex structures. Here, I confine myself to a brief presentation of two topics.
1. An anthropology according to family matrix is based on three categories, 
all necessarily related, owing its very existence to the mutual interpenetration: 
I mean the categories of difference, relation and donation.
Regarding the first, it should be remembered that an anthropology based on 
(personal) difference is irreducible to any anthropology that annuls the individ-
uality of each personal being in a general and abstract overview, as total energy 
or as indefinite overriding principle. Every personal being is not just a  single 
exemplar of the generic human – or cosmic – neither just the appearance of it, 
that is diversified in its manifestation. Every personal being is unique and unre-
peatable, as the core of freedom.
Now this real and unavoidable difference is only possible through relation. In 
fact nothing is different from anything unless in relation to the different. There-
fore, the difference, considered as an absolute in itself, negates its own concept, 
becoming the one without difference. That one, not (or in-) different, could be the 
cosmos itself, or the idea of logos, or each individual monad, which is the human 
subject  – these are all forms of annulment of real difference, by annulment of 
relation. The difference, which constitutes the subjects, according to an anthro-
pology in family matrix, is always a relational difference, as noted above.
On the other hand, the relation of which we speak is not merely an inde-
terminate flow of any global thing  – like energy  – that just runs terminals or 
nodes of an apparently different network. The relation so designed as flow or 
anonymous motion, becomes pure repetition of the same and not real difference. 
Family relationships, by contrast, are a different relationship model, which base 
of relation and identity is precisely that difference. The human, understood on 
this basis, is permanent relation of differences – or rather, of different persons 
(cf. Duque 2005).
If, in addition, we want to describe more precisely the primary way of this 
relationship of different persons, according to the family model, then we would 
come to their qualification as a donation (and corresponding reception). As such, 
the anthropological model proposed by this concept of family  – and that can 
guide all human existence – is the conception of human relationship of different 
persons, according to the modality of the free gift. Societies in general have real 
and pragmatic difficulty in applying this anthropology, often limiting themselves 
to a policy of compromise. This does not invalidate that the deepest of human 
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orientation can – and should – be forward in this sense. Like Ricœur also said, 
when he spoke precisely about gratuitous love as a gift, “the tenacious incorpo-
ration, step by step, of a supplementary degree of compassion and generosity in 
all of our codes – including our penal codes and our codes of social justice – con-
stitutes a perfectly reasonable task, however difficult and interminable it may 
be” (Ricœur 1996, 37).
2. To speak of “incorporation” leads us to another topic of the anthropology 
according to a family matrix and that is the place of the body. In an overly syn-
thetic way, we could say that the western world has been living in the tension 
between a spiritualist anthropological matrix (generally considered gnostic) and 
an incarnational anthropological matrix. The application derived from the con-
cept of family – as when one speaks of the human family, or of a certain commu-
nity as a family – can suffer from Gnosticism, in that the foundation of this qual-
ification is only one unifying idea, a certain “spirit” that all share (like a tribal 
totem). But an anthropology based on actual family relationships, cannot escape 
the corporeal incarnation of these relationships. In fact, all the relationships dis-
cussed above, although they cannot be reduced to its biological component, are 
inevitably based on that component. Thus, anthropology according to a  fami-
ly matrix is an incarnated anthropology, in which the flesh of each subject, as 
a place of the relation of the different, can never be undone gnostically in an idea 
or generic spirit, independently of its articulation as a personal body, as the body 
of a relationship. It’s as body that we are sons, daughters, brothers, sisters, wives 
and husbands, mothers and fathers. And when we transfer those relationships to 
other areas, we live it in the body. For so is the human condition.
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